Summary. We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria.
Introduction
There is a widespread interest in coordination games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, since these games have many equilibria that are bad for all concerned, but still are di±cult to rule out by standard notions of rationality. The coordination game is of particular importance for macroeconomists, who believe that an economy may be become mired in a low-output equilibrium, see e.g. Bryant [2] , Cooper [4] , and Cooper and John [6] . Indeed, while all agents in the economy understand that the outcome is ine±cient, each agent, acting indepently, is powerless to coordinate the activities of other agents to reach a Pareto-preferred equilibrium. So, from this perspective, a depression in aggregate economic activity arises when the economy falls into the trap of a low activity level Nash equilibrium. Consider a 2 £ 2 coordination game between two players. The payo® matrix is given in Figure 1 . There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this simultaneous move game, the strategy pro¯les (a; a) and (b; b), as well as a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player selects the action a with probability 1 3 . These are Nash equilibria because each player is acting optimally given the choice of the other. The equilibria of this coordination game are strict Nash equilibria. Consequently, the strategy pro¯le (b; b) also satis¯es the conditions imposed by the most re¯ned equilibrium notions such as strategic stability in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens [12] . The multiplicity of equilibria, and thus the possibility of a Pareto-inferior equilibrium, derives from players' inability to coordinate their choices in this strategic environment. As a consequence, realized equilibrium outcomes that are Pareto-suboptimal relative to other equilibria are often termed coordination failures.
One conclusion of a fair amount of experimental evidence is that coordination problems are not a pure theoretical curiosity. In particular, coordination failures are routinely observed in experimental games, see e.g. Cooper et al. [5] , and Ochs [13] .
Complementary to the accumulation of evidence on coordination games has been the development of theories concerning equilibrium selection in these games. Harsanyi and Selten [9] have proposed the risk dominance principle. This principle models that the play of certain equilibrium strategies is riskier than the play of others given the underlying strategic uncertainty of a game. Carlsson and van Damme [3] have provided an argument for selection of an equilibrium in a coordination game. Their idea is to explore the equilibria of a nearby game of incomplete information. The equilibrium for the coordination game is then the limit of the equilibrium for the nearby game as the amount of incomplete information goes to zero. They¯nd that in the limit it is the risk-dominant equilibrium that is selected. Another approach to equilibrium selection involves exploring the dynamics of coordination games. This approach requires the speci¯cation of a dynamic process describing the play of agents involved in such a game, see e.g. Kandori et al. [11] . Another part of the literature has looked for possible remedies to coordination problems like preplay communication or cheap talk (see Farrel [7] , [8] and Rabin [15] ). This paper considers a novel and simple way to resolve coordination problems, which consists of the combination of fuzzy play and the introduction of a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean that each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to a matching device. The matching device is a very simple one. It only selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. We focus on pure n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. Using the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, we show that players coordinate directly on the best match possible. They do not use the option of fuzzy play, but submit a single strategy to the matching device.
This strategy is the one corresponding to the Pareto optimal outcome. The concept of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability reverts to the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies for the class of two-player normal-form games. Let us apply this well-known concept to our example. Obviously, the strategy which consists of sending only the action b to the device is weakly dominated by the strategy where both actions a and b are sent. At the¯rst round of the iterative procedure we eliminate the strategy which consists of sending only the action b. At the second round, the strategy where both actions are sent is now weakly dominated by the strategy which consists of sending only the action a. So, the unique trembling-hand perfect rationalizable solution is the one where both players choose to send only the Pareto-optimal action a.
Fuzzy play and the matching device
We consider an n-player pure coordination game denoted by
where N = f1; : : : ; ng is the set of players, A i is the¯nite set of actions or pure strategies of player i, and u i is player i's payo® function. A game is a coordination game if the players have the same number m of strategies, which are indexed so that it is always a strict Nash equilibrium for both players to play strategies having the same index. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the sets of pure strategies of all players coincide,
which makes it meaningful to take intersections of such sets.
A pure coordination game is a coordination game for which the payo®s o® the diagonal are zero. In the game G we have that strict Nash equilibria are on the diagonal, and outside the diagonal the payo®s are zero for both players. Finally, we impose that the strict Nash equilibria are Pareto ranked, without loss of generality decreasing in the index of the strategy. Summarizing,
We introduce both fuzzy play and a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean that a player does not necessarily restrict himself to play a single pure strategy a i k ; but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set A i that he submits to the matching device.
He thereby rules out that strategies outside A i are played. As a consequence, the set of strategies of each player becomes
The matching device is assumed to operate as follows. It randomly selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, the matching device does not impose that the best alternatives are matched.
Let ¼(a i k ) denote the prior probability that the matching device selects the strategy
Suppose player i submits the set of actions s i 2 S i to the matching device. Two cases have to be distinguished. Either the players' action sets have one or more actions in common, or they have nothing in common. That is, either there is k such that for all i 2 N; a i k 2 s i ; or there is no k such that for all i 2 N; a i k 2 s i ; so \ i2N s i = ;: If \ i2N s i = ;; then a i k 2 s i is chosen with probability
If \ i2N s i 6 = ; and a k 2 \ i2N s i , then a k is chosen with probability
The way the matching device selects strategies is assumed to be common knowledge among all players.
We can express the payo®s of the induced game as follows:
We denote the induced game by
The concepts we will use to analyze G are perfect Nash equilibrium and trembling-hand perfect rationalizability.
Perfect Nash equilibrium
Three equivalent de¯nitions of perfect Nash equilibrium have been proposed in the literature. One of them has been introduced by Selten [16] and is the following. A perfect Nash equilibrium is a limit point of a sequence of completely mixed strategy pro¯les with the property that it is a best reply against every element in the sequence. As general notation, we denote by ¢ (X) the set of all Borel probability measures on X: For¯nite X;
we denote by ¢ 0 (X) the set of all Borel probability measures giving positive probability to each member of X. Given c i 2 ¢(S i ), we denote by c i (s i ) the probability that c i assigns to the subset of pure strategies s i : Perfect Nash equilibrium for the game G is de¯ned formally as follows.
De¯nition 1 A perfect Nash equilibrium of the game G is a mixed strategy pro¯le c 2
We say that a player's strategy is weakly dominated if the player has another strategy at least as good no matter what the other players do and better for at least some strategy pro¯le of the other players. To characterize the perfect Nash equilibria of the game G; the following two lemmas are very useful.
Lemma 1 If a strategy pro¯le is a perfect Nash equilibrium of G; then the strategy of neither player is weakly dominated.
Lemma 2
The game G possesses at least one trembling hand perfect equilibrium. examine the set of all Nash equilibria of the game G. From Theorem 1 we derive that the Nash equilibria in symmetric pure strategies of the game G coincide with the Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the game G. Symmetry implies s 1 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = s n : Next, from our characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria of G one may immediately infer that s i ; i 2 N; is a singleton. Moreover, each strategy combination (fa 1 k g; : : : ; fa n k g) is a Nash equilibrium of G: Obviously, each strategy combination (a 1 k ; : : : ; a n k ) is a Nash equilibrium of G. We have shown the following result.
Corollary 1
The symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game G are (fa k g; : : : ; fa k g), k = 1; ::; m, and coincide with the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game G; given by (a k ; : : : ; a k ), k = 1; ::; m.
We turn next to the characterization of perfect Nash equilibria. 
Using Lemma 1 and knowing that every strategy s i which does not contain a i 1 is weakly dominated by s i [fa i 1 g, it follows that no perfect Nash equilibrium puts positive weight on such a strategy s i . Using our characterization of Nash equilibria in Theorem 1, it follows that the strategy (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) 2 S is a perfect Nash equilibrium only if \ i2N s i = fa 1 g:
The unique symmetric perfect Nash equilibrium of G is (fa 
Trembling-hand perfect rationalizability
In the same way as rationalizability (Bernheim [1] , Pearce [14] ) is related to Nash equilibrium, the concept of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability due to Herings and Vannetelbosch [10] is related to perfect Nash equilibrium. Instead of using best responses as in rationalizability, the players are required to use cautious best responses in trembling-hand perfect rationalizability.
Another motivation which leads to the trembling-hand perfect rationalizability concept is obtained by carrying the logic behind cautious rationalizability (due to Pearce [14] ) one step further. This implies that one wants to consider a solution concept where players eliminate responses that are not cautious in each round. All pure strategies that haven't been deleted yet are considered as possible by the players, and therefore they do not use conjectures that put probability zero on some of these strategies. Trembling-hand perfect rationalizability (THPR) is de¯ned by the following iterative procedure.
and there is c ¡i 2 int(ch(T ¡i k¡1 )) such that c i is a best response against c ¡i within T i k¡1 : The set T 1 = lim k!1 T k is the set of trembling-hand perfect rationalizable strategy pro¯les of the game G.
At each step of the iteration, a strategy c i of player i has to be a best response against some conjecture c ¡i 2 int(ch(T ¡i k¡1 )); the relative interior of the convex hull of the set T ¡i k¡1 : Such a conjecture is called a cautious conjecture. It follows that at each step of the iteration at least all weakly dominated strategies are deleted. The set of tremblinghand perfect rationalizable strategy pro¯les is shown to be non-empty in Herings and Vannetelbosch [10] .
Theorem 3
The set of trembling-hand perfect rationalizable strategy pro¯les of the game G is non-empty.
Lemma 3 claims that any strategy which excludes the action a i 1 is never a cautious best response, and can therefore not belong to T i 1 . In other words, it is never a best response for player i to send a subset of actions to the matching device which does not contain the Pareto one, a i 1 . Moreover, one can show that submitting any strategy to the matching device that contains the Pareto action a Proof. We show¯rst that ) and (iv) for all s i 2 S i ,
Consider any s i such that a We can use Lemma 3 to show the following main result.
Theorem 4 It holds that
Proof. From Lemma 3 we know that any s j 2 T To illustrate our results we consider the 3 £ 3 pure coordination game depicted in Figure 3 . Once we introduce fuzzy play and the simple matching device, we obtain a new game whose matrix payo®s are given by Figure 4 where 3 > x > 2, 2 > y > 1, 3 > z > 1, 3 > w > 1 and w > y. Obviously, the strategies of player i that do not include the action a 1 are weakly dominated, and hence do not belong to T i 1 . Indeed, the strategies fa 2 g, fa 3 g, fa 2 ; a 3 g are weakly dominated (and are never cautious best responses) by the strategies fa 1 ; a 2 g, fa 1 ; a 3 g, fa 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 g. At the¯rst round we eliminate all the strategies that do not include the action a 1 . At the second round, both players know that their opponent give positive weight to fa 1 g, fa 1 ; a 2 g, fa 1 ; a 3 g and fa 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 g of their opponent. As a consequence each player has a unique cautious best response, which is the strategy fa 1 g. Indeed, this strategy will guarantee a payo® of 3 while any other strategy gives a payo® of at most 3 and a payo® strictly less than 3 against some strategies within the support of the conjecture. So, each player has a unique trembling-hand perfect rationalizable strategy, which consists of sending only the action a 1 to the device and which allows the players to coordinate perfectly on the Pareto-optimal outcome. Figure 4 : Fuzzy play in the 3 £ 3 coordination game
Conclusion
We have revisited n-player pure coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria.
The novelties that we have introduced are fuzzy play and a matching device. Each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device we have considered is a very simple one. It only selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. We have applied the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability to the resulting situation. It has been shown that all players coordinate directly on the Pareto optimal outcome. As a consequence, the players do neither use the possibility of fuzzy play, nor do they use the matching device. Both concepts lead to the conclusion that the mere possibility of fuzzy play and the mere availability of a simple matching device is su±cient for direct coordination on the Pareto optimal outcome.
